An Empirically-Derived Taxonomy of Moral Concepts

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Abstract

We propose that methods from the study of category-based induction can be used to test the accuracy of theories of moral judgment. We had participants rate the likelihood that a person would engage in a variety of actions, given information about a previous behavior. From these likelihood ratings, we extracted a hierarchical, taxonomic model of how moral violations relate to each other (Study 1). We then tested the descriptive adequacy of this model against an alternative model inspired by Moral Foundations Theory, using classic tasks from induction research (Studies 2a and 2b), and using a measure of confirmation, which accounts for the baseline frequency of these violations (Study 3). Lastly, we conducted focused tests of combinations of violations where the models make differing predictions (Study 4). This research provides new insight into how people represent moral concepts, connecting classic methods from cognitive science with contemporary themes in moral psychology.

Keywords: moral judgment; inductive reasoning; concepts and categories; taxonomic models

An Empirically-Derived Taxonomy of Moral Concepts

The psychology of moral judgment has been a very active area of research in recent years (see, e.g., Bartels, Bauman, Cushman, Pizarro, & McGraw, 2016; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008), with several theories proposing a handful of discrete types of moral violations (e.g., Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). However, this research has generally not examined whether these theories accord with laypeople's understandings of moral concepts. In this paper, we use methods from the study of category-based induction (Feeney & Heit, 2007; Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, López, & Shafir, 1990) to investigate this question. We use inductive judgments of the likelihood of different behaviors, given prior behaviors, to derive a model of how moral violations relate to each other and compare this model to another that is inspired by Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012). We consider MFT to be a useful case study in the use of inductive judgments to study representations of moral concepts, because it has inspired a great deal of research on a diverse array of topics (e.g., persuasion [Day, Fiske, Downing, & Trail, 2014]; personality disorders [Glenn, Iyer, Graham, Koleva, & Haidt,, 2009]; life narratives [McAdams et al., 2008]; victim-blaming [Niemi & Young, 2016]; economic behavior [Schier, Ockenfels, & Hofmann, 2016]), and it posits discrete categories of moral violations that can be studied using these methods.

MFT argues that we are attuned to certain patterns of behavior that prompt intuitive judgments of approval or disapproval (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). These intuitions are elaborated into clusters of virtues that are observed cross-culturally. The earliest version of MFT (Haidt & Joseph, 2004) considered four of these "moral foundations", harm prevention ("care"), fairness, respect for and obedience to authority, and bodily and spiritual purity. Later work added a fifth

foundation—loyalty to important in-groups, and drew a social-functional distinction between care and fairness – the "individualizing" foundations – and loyalty, authority, and purity – the "binding" foundations (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007). These different clusters of foundations are thought to represent different strategies for suppressing selfishness to allow for group living (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). The individualizing foundations regulate behavior by instilling respect for others' rights and welfare, whereas the binding foundations do so by limiting freedoms and prescribing roles for group members to fulfill (Haidt, 2008). Recent work has proposed a sixth moral foundation, liberty, which has not yet received the same level of empirical scrutiny as the five that preceded it (Iyer et al., 2012, see also Graham et al. 2011). The liberty foundation fits within the superordinate category of individualizing foundations, which are about the rights of individuals, rather than the good of collectives (J. Graham, personal communication, October 5, 2017; see also Haidt, 2012). These multiple virtues give rise to distinct categories of violations, with qualitatively different kinds of actions violating care versus purity, for instance (Chakroff, Dungan, & Young, 2013; Dungan, Chakroff, & Young, 2017; Young & Saxe, 2011).

It is plausible that the social-functional distinction between individualizing and binding moral foundations is also a psychological distinction that people make. One way to represent this would be a hierarchical knowledge structure, as presented in Figure 1. In this representation, the individualizing foundations belong to one superordinate category of virtues, whereas the binding foundations belong to a separate superordinate category (we present the liberty foundation, and its conceptual link to its superordinate category, individualizing foundations, as dotted lines, to represent the less established status of this foundation within MFT). However, MFT is usually presented as a theory of evolutionary and cultural psychology, not of concepts

and categories, so it remains an open question whether or not people's mental representations of moral concepts distinguish them along this social-functional divide.


Figure 1. A plausible representation of moral concepts, based on Moral Foundations Theory.

In what follows, we use people's inductive judgments about the likelihood of different behaviors to derive a model of mental representations of moral concepts. In doing so, we demonstrate how methods from the study of induction can be used to test the descriptive accuracy of models of moral judgment.

Category-Based Induction and Morality

The study of category-based induction often assumes that concepts are organized taxonomically, and we accept this as a working assumption here. [1] On this assumption, the strength of inductive inferences that a person makes from one object to another depends on how closely related the objects are in that person's taxonomic representation. Consider an example, adapted from Osherson et al. (1990). Given the premise "robins use serotonin as a

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[1] Although this project follows other category-based induction research that assumes taxonomic representations (see, e.g., Carey, 1985; Choi, Nisbett, & Smith, 1997; Gelman & Coley, 1990; Heit, 2000; Lopez, 1993; Osherson et al., 1990), there are, of course, good alternative ideas about how concepts are represented (see, e.g., Rips, Smith, & Medin, 2012; Murphy, 2004).

neurotransmitter", the conclusion "sparrows use serotonin as a neurotransmitter" is usually

considered more likely to be true than "geese use serotonin as a neurotransmitter." This is

because robins and sparrows are closer to one another in people's taxonomies of birds than are

robins and geese. Robins and sparrows might belong to the superordinate category "songbirds",

whereas geese would belong to a separate superordinate category, perhaps "waterfowl". Geese

and robins unite only at a higher level of the taxonomy (presumably the top-level category,

"birds"), and therefore inductive inferences from robins to geese are not especially strong.

We applied this same logic to taxonomies of moral violations. Consider the premise "Joe

committed a violation of fairness" (henceforth, a "fairness violation", etc.). If an MFT-like

taxonomy[2] as shown in Figure 1 is a viable model of people's representations of moral concepts,

then the conclusion "Joe would commit a care violation" should be considered more likely than

the conclusion "Joe would commit an authority violation", because fairness and care belong to

the same superordinate category (i.e., individualizing foundations), whereas authority belongs to

a separate superordinate category (i.e., binding foundations) and only unites with fairness at the

top-level category, moral virtues.

We examined the structure of people's representations of moral concepts across five

studies. In Study 1, participants rated the likelihood that a person would engage in a wide

variety of actions that violate the six moral foundations (conclusions), given information about

previous behavior (premises). We found that there is consensual knowledge that our participants

drew upon in making these judgments. From their likelihood ratings, we derived a taxonomy of

moral concepts to model this shared knowledge. This taxonomy does not resemble an MFT-like

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[2] It is not clear that MFT necessarily predicts that people's representations of moral concepts will be organized by social-functional categories. So, we use "MFT" to refer to Moral Foundations Theory as it is typically articulated, and "MFT-like" to describe the taxonomy presented in Figure 1.

taxonomy, but it has an interpretable structure. In Studies 2a and 2b, participants indicated which premises most strongly supported which conclusions, in tasks adapted from classic research on category-based induction. Next, in Study 3, we modified the task from Study 1 to account for differences in baseline frequency among our stimuli. Finally, in Study 4, we focused on cases where the derived taxonomy and an MFT-like taxonomy make differing predictions about membership in superordinate categories. Across Studies 2-4, participants' inductive judgments more closely resembled the predictions of the derived taxonomy than an MFT-like taxonomy.

Study 1

Study 1 had two aims. The first was to assess whether there is enough agreement about the conceptual relatedness of different kinds of moral violations to warrant development of a model of people's taxonomies of moral concepts. If there is, the second aim was to use exploratory analyses to extract the taxonomic structure of representations of moral concepts.

Method

Stimuli. We felt that it was important to use stimuli where the violations of each moral foundation differed primarily in the moral foundation that characterized them, rather than on other factors like their overall moral wrongness. We worried that if the violations of some foundations were more severe than others, then participants' likelihood ratings could potentially just group by wrongness—our participants might infer that a person who had committed a particularly bad prior act (premise) is just a morally worse person, prone to especially bad behavior. They might therefore infer that that this person would be more likely to commit a particularly bad subsequent act (conclusion) for reasons other than the specific virtue that each

act violates. To address this concern, we conducted five norming studies (total $N = 1,267$) on 244 behavioral descriptions. The studies were conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk, the same population that participated in our main studies. Most of the stimuli included in the norming studies were original, or were modified forms of the Moral Foundations Vignettes (Clifford, Iyengar, Cabeza, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2015), though a minority came from other research. Stimuli and details about the norming studies are presented in the Supplemental Materials.

We selected seven behaviors violating each moral foundation for our stimulus set (e.g., a person drives past a clearly injured man on an empty road [care], edges out another person in a long line [fairness], forces their daughter to enroll as a pre-med student in college [liberty], makes critical comments about their home country [loyalty], sends out an email calling their boss an "idiot" [authority], or views deviant pornography [purity]). These stimuli uniquely exemplify the moral foundations, and provide broad conceptual coverage of each one (e.g., the liberty stimuli include both overbearing parents and overreaching politicians; see documentation in the Supplemental Materials). Also, the mean moral wrongness ratings for the six moral foundations are closely equated (5.20-5.26, on a 1-9 scale in pre-tests). We also included seven non-moral actions that extensive pretesting found to be morally inert (e.g., "a person goes parasailing"). Lastly, we included seven counter-normative actions that do not exemplify any moral foundation (e.g., "while in a rush, a person bumps into someone on the street, but does not say 'excuse me'"). These actions largely consist of violations of polite etiquette.

Participants. Four hundred twenty-five participants were recruited online through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Throughout this paper, we excluded participants for failing "Captcha" verifications (suggesting they were automated "bot" programs), failing to reach the end of a study, or failing attention checks. After exclusions, we retained a final sample of $N =$

372 (195 female, $M_{Age} = 37.47$, $SD_{Age} = 11.36$). Because this study is exploratory in its methods,

we sought to recruit a fairly large sample of approximately 350 participants. This target sample

size was determined before data collection.[3]

Materials and Procedure. Each participant made 64 likelihood judgments, one for each

possible premise/conclusion combination of the eight conceptual categories in our stimulus set

(e.g., authority/authority, authority/non-moral, etc.). We had participants judge the likelihood of

other behaviors (rather than, for instance, making similarity judgments) because a central goal in

understanding people's moral virtues is to predict their likely intentions and behaviors (see, e.g.,

Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 2007; Landy, Piazza, & Goodwin, 2016; Landy & Uhlmann, in press;

Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998). So, this seemed like a

natural task for examining representations of virtues and violations.

Premises and conclusions were randomly sampled for each question, with the restriction

that the premise and conclusion could not be the same action. Questions took the following form:

"A person edges out another person in a long line. Given this information, how likely is it that, if

they were driving along an empty road and saw a man who was clearly injured, this person

would drive past the man and not stop to help him?" This is one of 7 premises x 7 conclusions =

49 possible fairness/care questions. Likelihood ratings were made using a sliding scale (0% =

"There is no chance this person would do this"; 100% = "This person would definitely do this").

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[3] Participants could not take part in more than one study in this project (including the norming studies described in the Supplemental Materials), with one exception. Studies 2a and 2b were run over a year after the norming studies and Studies 1, 3, and 4, in response to feedback from colleagues on an earlier version of this paper. We therefore did not exclude participants from the earlier studies from Studies 2a and 2b (though each participant could take part in only Study 2a or Study 2b, not both).

All studies reported in this paper were reviewed and approved by the University of Chicago Social and Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board. Data and materials from all studies reported in this paper can be found at https://osf.io/k5mpr/.

Results

Cultural consensus analysis. The first aim of this study was to examine whether people agree on the relations between the different kinds of actions that participants judged. To test this, we used the informal version of the Cultural Consensus Model (a part of Cultural Consensus Theory [CCT], Romney, Batchelder, & Weller, 1987; Weller, 2007). CCT recommends statistical techniques to assess, by the degree of consistency across participants' responses, whether they are drawing on the same shared knowledge in their responding. If there was not consensus across participants in our data, this would undermine the goal of extracting a taxonomic model, as different participants would be representing these concepts in vastly different ways.

Following the methods of CCT, we transposed our data such that the 64 ratings that participants made (fairness/care, authority/non-moral, etc.) were the rows, and participants were the columns. We then used unrotated Principal Components Analysis to examine the degree of consensus. The first and second factors extracted had eigenvalues of 81.09 and 17.00. In CCT, it is generally accepted that a ratio of the first to the second eigenvalue of 3.0 or greater indicates consensus (see Weller, 2007). This ratio in this analysis was 4.77, suggesting that our participants drew on shared, consensual knowledge in making their likelihood judgments. We now turn to characterizing the structure of this consensual representation.

Exploratory analyses. We computed a bidirectional measure of conceptual relatedness between categories of actions by averaging the likelihood estimates made by a participant within each pair of categories. For instance, if a participant rated the likelihood of committing a fairness violation, knowing that a person had committed a care violation, as 70%, and the likelihood of committing a care violation, knowing that a person had committed a fairness violation, as 50%, that participant's fairness/care relatedness score would be (70% + 50%) / 2 = 60%.

Mean conceptual relatedness scores are presented in Table 1. Note that within-foundation relatedness scores (presented on the diagonal) are generally larger than between-foundation scores (presented off-diagonal), suggesting that our judgment task captures the conceptual relatedness between different actions. Also, notably, liberty violations, purity violations, and non-moral actions tend to have lower mean conceptual relatedness scores than other categories (mean scores: 42%, 35%, and 40%; other categories ranged from 48% to 51%). This suggests that these three types of actions are somewhat distinct from other types of actions in people's taxonomies of moral concepts.

Table 1. Mean conceptual relatedness scores, defined as the mean likelihood judgment within category pairs.

	Care	Fairness	Liberty	Authority	Loyalty	Purity	Non-Moral	Counter-Normative
Care	60%	52%	45%	56%	52%	37%	38%	53%
Fairness		63%	46%	57%	55%	35%	42%	53%
Liberty			60%	40%	39%	28%	37%	41%
Authority				68%	55%	38%	40%	56%
Loyalty					61%	35%	39%	45%
Purity						36%	32%	36%
Non-Moral							54%	41%
Counter-Normative								57%
Mean Relatedness	**49%**	**50%**	**42%**	**51%**	**48%**	**35%**	**40%**	**48%**

We next used hierarchical cluster analysis and multi-dimensional scaling to explore these patterns (see Medin et al., 2006, for application of these methods to folk taxonomies of natural kinds). First, we submitted the mean relatedness scores to a hierarchical cluster analysis using average linkage between groups. Average linkage is considered to be a compromise between single linkage and complete linkage that minimizes the problems that these methods can create (Sokal & Michener, 1958; Yim & Ramdeen, 2015). Consistent with the pattern of means in Table 1, violations of care, authority, fairness, and loyalty, and counter-normative actions, were close to one another in Euclidean space and clustered early in the analysis. In contrast, violations of liberty and purity, and non-moral actions, were quite distant from all other categories.[4] Figure 2 presents a dendrogram illustrating this analysis.

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[4] We conducted a series of robustness checks on this analysis. The results are similar if conceptual relatedness is defined as the minimum, maximum, or product of likelihood judgments within a category pair, or if single or complete linkage is used to join clusters. Also, if liberty violations, counter-normative actions, and non-moral actions are excluded, and the analysis is conducted solely on the five most established moral foundations, purity is still very distant from the other foundations, which cluster early. See the Supplemental Materials for details.

Figure 2. Dendrogram illustrating hierarchical cluster analysis (average linkage) of relatedness scores, defined as the mean likelihood judgment within category pairs. *Note.* X-axis represents squared Euclidean distances between agglomerated clusters.

We confirmed this result by subtracting relatedness scores from 100%, and submitting the resulting dissimilarity scores to multi-dimensional scaling,[5] treating the dissimilarity scores as ordinal variables. Figure 3 presents the two-dimensional solution. Violations of care, authority, fairness, and loyalty, and counter-normative actions, are quite close to one another in the resultant two-dimensional space, with liberty violations, and especially purity violations and non-moral actions, more distant. Model stress was .08, which is generally considered acceptable (see, e.g., Kruskal, 1964a, 1964b; Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968), though the model stress for the three-dimensional solution was lower, at .04. A four-dimensional solution did not converge because there were too many parameters to estimate. So, the three-dimensional solution provides the best available model of these data. In this model, and in agreement with

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[5] Identical results are obtained if the dissimilarity scores are calculated by subtracting relatedness scores from the maximum observed relatedness (68%) rather than from the maximum possible relatedness (100%). We therefore focus on the conceptually simpler analysis.

the analyses above, liberty violations, purity violations, and non-moral actions were quite distant

from all other categories, including each other (mean Euclidean distances 2.42, 2.98, and 2.49,

respectively, all other categories < 2.11). [6]

Figure 3. Two-dimensional solution derived from multi-dimensional scaling of relatedness
scores, defined as the mean likelihood judgment within category pairs. Model stress is .08.

Discussion

These analyses suggest that care, fairness, authority, and loyalty violations, and impolite

actions, are closely related in the representations of moral concepts that our participants shared.

Liberty and purity violations and non-moral actions are less closely related. As can be seen in the

Supplemental Materials, the exact configuration of the eight categories of actions varies slightly

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[6] The pattern of results is actually somewhat clearer if the dissimilarity scores are treated as interval variables,
however, the model stress is unacceptably high under these assumptions (two-dimensional solution: .16, three-
dimensional solution: .14). As with the cluster analyses, the results of the MDS analysis remain substantively
unchanged if conceptual relatedness is defined as the minimum, maximum, or product of likelihood judgments
within a category pair. Also, if the analysis is conducted only on the care, fairness, authority, loyalty, and purity
foundations, purity remains very distant from the other foundations. See the Supplemental Materials for details.

depending on how the models are specified (e.g., when conceptual relatedness is defined as the maximum likelihood judgment within a category pair, loyalty violations and counter-normative actions cluster first, and liberty violations cluster with non-moral actions before purity violations do). What is consistent across all of these analyses is that care, fairness, authority, and loyalty violations, and counter-normative actions, are always close to one another in space, whereas liberty and purity violations and non-moral actions are noticeably more distant.

Therefore, we model the virtues of care, fairness, authority, loyalty, and politeness as belonging to a single superordinate category. We cautiously and provisionally label this category "Propriety", which is defined as "conformity to established standards of good or proper behavior or manners" (http://www.dictionary.com/browse/propriety). The standards of behavior (or, more simply, rules) that these violations offend against are usually explicit (e.g., "respect your elders", "be nice to people"), taught early in life, and relevant to social behavior. We think that this captures what sets these virtues apart from liberty, purity, and non-moral actions. Liberty is about not *creating* rules that are oppressive or burdensome for others. Purity violations are often highly unusual, so explicit rules forbidding them (e.g., "do not write erotic poetry about your cat") may not be explicitly articulated, or, when rules forbidding less bizarre purity violations are articulated, they tend to be about private or personal conduct, rather than social behavior (e.g., "do not eat pork", "do not have sex outside of marriage"). Lastly, non-moral actions (at least, the ones in our stimulus set) have nothing to do with rules at all. Labeling this category "propriety" also accounts for the unexpected finding that counter-normative actions clustered with care, fairness, authority, and loyalty violations; the counter-normative actions in our stimulus set mostly consist of violations of rules of etiquette that are taught early in life (e.g., "say 'excuse me'"). We should emphasize that this category label is tentative, and that there are

not likely to be necessary and sufficient conditions for a violation to be placed in this category. Because we think this provisional label captures the family resemblance among the violations that clustered together, we will use it through the remainder of this paper. Our derived taxonomy of moral concepts is presented in Figure 4.

Figure 4. A bottom-up taxonomy of moral concepts derived in Study 1.

This study supports three conclusions. First, our participants possess shared beliefs about how violations of different moral virtues relate. Second, people's representations of moral concepts can be modeled as being organized in a hierarchical, taxonomic structure, and this structure can be uncovered using the methods that we have borrowed from research on category-based induction. Third, this structure is not organized into the social-functional categories of MFT, but it is interpretable, nonetheless, with three distinct categories of violations.

Studies 2a and 2b

We next used two classic methods from the study of category-based induction to test predictions of the taxonomy derived in Study 1 against predictions of an MFT-like taxonomy. In Study 2a, we presented participants with two premises, and asked which one made a conclusion more likely (see López, Atran, Coley, Medin, & Smith, 1997). In Study 2b, we presented participants with one premise, and asked which of two conclusions was more likely, given the premise (see López, 1993; Medin, Lynch, Coley, & Atran, 1997).

Method

Participants. One hundred-three participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk began Study 2a, and 100 began Study 2b. After exclusions, we were left with samples of $N = 100$ for both studies (Study 2a: 31 female, $M_{Age} = 34.73$, $SD_{Age} = 9.81$; Study 2b: 41 female, $M_{Age} = 33.62$, $SD_{Age} = 9.02$). The analyses in these studies are one-sample t-tests, but we did not have an *a priori* estimate of the effect sizes we would observe. Based on power analyses conducted with the G*Power software package (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), samples of $N = 100$ provide adequate statistical power (.95) to detect a small- to medium-sized effect ($d = .36$). This target sample size was determined before data collection.

Materials and procedure. In these studies, we examined cases where the taxonomy derived in Study 1 and an MFT-like taxonomy make differing predictions about which premises/conclusions should be more closely related to a given conclusion/premise. For example, in the derived taxonomy, fairness belongs to the same superordinate category as authority, whereas purity does not; in MFT, the reverse is true (see Figures 1 and 4). Therefore, the derived taxonomy predicts that a person who committed a fairness violation should be seen as more likely to commit an authority violation than should someone who committed a purity violation (Study 2a). It similarly predicts that a person who committed an authority violation

should be seen as more likely to commit a fairness violation than a purity violation (Study 2b).

An MFT-like taxonomy makes the opposite predictions. There are eight such combinations of

premises and conclusions, presented in Tables 2 and 3. Politeness and non-moral characteristics

were not included in Studies 2-4, because these studies test the predictions of the derived

taxonomy against an MFT-like taxonomy, which would not include them.

Table 2. Descriptive and inferential statistics, Study 2a.

Conclusion	Premise Agreeing with MFT-Like Taxonomy	Premise Agreeing with Derived Taxonomy	Mean Percentage Selecting Derived	$t(99)$	p	d
Authority	Purity	Care	70.2%	7.75	< .001	0.77
Authority	Purity	Fairness	68.0%	4.88	< .001	0.49
Loyalty	Purity	Care	60.8%	4.03	< .001	0.40
Loyalty	Purity	Fairness	54.3%	1.82	.071	0.18
Care	Liberty	Authority	63.7%	5.16	< .001	0.52
Care	Liberty	Loyalty	57.0%	2.81	.006	0.28
Fairness	Liberty	Authority	58.3%	3.16	.002	0.32
Fairness	Liberty	Loyalty	56.3%	2.34	.021	0.23
Overall			**61.0%**	**10.34**	**< .001**	**1.03**

Table 3. Descriptive and inferential statistics, Study 2b.

Premise	Conclusion Agreeing with MFT-Like Taxonomy	Conclusion Agreeing with Derived Taxonomy	Mean Percentage Selecting Derived	$t(99)$	p	d
Authority	Purity	Care	86.3%	17.93	< .001	1.79
Authority	Purity	Fairness	85.3%	15.87	< .001	1.59
Loyalty	Purity	Care	78.0%	10.90	< .001	1.09
Loyalty	Purity	Fairness	81.5%	12.85	< .001	1.28
Care	Liberty	Authority	68.0%	6.95	< .001	0.70
Care	Liberty	Loyalty	62.3%	4.90	< .001	0.49
Fairness	Liberty	Authority	67.5%	6.44	< .001	0.64
Fairness	Liberty	Loyalty	59.8%	3.38	.001	0.34
Overall			**73.6%**	**16.71**	**< .001**	**1.67**

In Study 2a, we presented participants with two premises (e.g., "Person A edges out another person in a long line. Person B looks at pornography in which an 18-year-old model has been digitally altered to look like she is 13." [violations of fairness and purity, respectively]), and asked which one more strongly supported a conclusion ("Given this information, which person would be more likely to send out an email to other low-level employees, calling the company president an 'idiot', if they were a low-level employee?" [authority]). In Study 2b, we presented participants with one premise (e.g., "A low-level company employee sends out an email to other low-level employees, calling the company president an 'idiot.'"), and asked which of two conclusions it more strongly supported ("Given this information, which of the following is this person more likely to do or have done?"). In both studies, participants saw four instances of each of the eight critical premise/conclusion combinations, with all premises and conclusions randomly drawn from the same set of stimuli used in Study 1.[7] The order of presentation of the premises in Study 2a and the conclusions in Study 2b was counter-balanced.

Results

For each participant, we calculated the percentage of responses that agreed with the derived taxonomy (e.g., in Study 2b, the percentage of instances, out of four, when a participant selected a Fairness conclusion over a Purity conclusion, given an Authority premise). The mean percentages for all eight combinations of premises and conclusions were greater than 50% across both studies (significantly so in 15 of 16 cases), and, when averaging across the eight combinations, participants' judgments strongly supported the derived taxonomy (see Tables 2

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[7] Due to a programming error, not all participants saw four instances of Fairness and Purity premises and an Authority conclusion in Study 2a. For clarity, we present the results as the percentage of responses agreeing with each taxonomy, rather than the raw number.

and 3).[8] Averaging across the eight combinations, 79 out of 100 participants in Study 1a and 89

out of 100 participants in Study 2b made judgments in agreement with the derived taxonomy in

more than 50% of cases, significantly greater than 50% of participants, binomial test ps < .001.

In other words, participants made inductive inferences about immoral behaviors that more

closely align with the predictions of the taxonomy derived in Study 1 than those of an MFT-like

taxonomy.

Discussion

These studies used tasks from research on taxonomic mental representations to test the

validity of the taxonomy of moral concepts derived in Study 1. Participants consistently made

inductive inferences that agreed with the predictions of this model, suggesting that their mental

representations of moral concepts resemble this taxonomy more than they do an MFT-like

taxonomy.

Study 3

In Study 3, we had participants make likelihood judgments similar to those in Study 1,

but used a measure of *confirmation* as our dependent variable (Tentori, Crupi, Bonini, &

Osherson, 2011). Also called "degree of support", confirmation represents how much more or

less credible a conclusion becomes, given a premise. This is not the same as the posterior

probability of the conclusion, which we examined in Study 1. Rather, it is the contribution made

by a premise to the plausibility of a conclusion, regardless of the baseline probability of the

conclusion being true.[9] Because our stimuli are not equated for baseline frequency (though

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[8] It might be argued that parametric t-tests are inappropriate for this analysis because the variables of interest can only take on five values (0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 100%), and should not be treated as continuous. The results are the same when Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are used instead.
[9] We thank Daniel Osherson for suggesting that we use a confirmation measure.

future research could equate on this dimension, see Supplemental Materials), it was important to test our derived taxonomy using a confirmation measure.

Method

Participants. Four hundred twenty-six participants began the study on Amazon Mechanical Turk. After exclusions, we retained a final sample of $N = 367$ (187 female, $M_{Age} = 35.35$, $SD_{Age} = 10.88$). One of the focal tests in this study is a binomial test with a null hypothesis $p_0 = .50$. A sample size of approximately $N = 350$ provides good statistical power (.97) to detect a significant difference of .10 (Chow, Shao, & Wang, 2008, p. 84-85), and we aimed for a sample of approximately this size. This target sample size was determined before data collection.

Materials and procedure. Each participant made 42 total likelihood judgments of the sort examined in Study 1, one for each possible premise/conclusion combination of the six moral foundations, and six baseline judgments with no premise. Premises were randomly selected for each question. Rather than randomly select the conclusion for each question, however, each participant was randomly assigned one of seven conclusions from each foundation, which appeared in all likelihood judgments for that foundation. Each participant saw the same conclusion from every foundation seven times, so that their conditioned judgments were directly comparable to their baseline judgments. Likelihood ratings were made on the same 0% to 100% sliding scale as in Study 1.

Results

We used a simple measure of confirmation, computed by subtracting baseline judgments from conditioned judgments (Eells, 1982; Jeffrey, 1992). For instance, if a participant rated the

likelihood of a person driving past an injured man without stopping to help at 30% when they

had no other information (i.e., the baseline judgment; care), and the likelihood of this, given that

the person had edged out another person in a long line, at 65% (i.e., the conditioned judgment;

fairness), the confirmation that this premise brings to this conclusion would be 65% - 30% =

35%.

Both the taxonomy derived in Study 1 and an MFT-like taxonomy classify 18 premise-

conclusion pairs as belonging to the same superordinate category (e.g., authority and care are

both part of propriety in the derived taxonomy, and loyalty and purity are both binding

foundations in MFT), and 18 as belonging to different superordinate categories (e.g., liberty and

purity in both taxonomies, see Figures 1 and 4). We calculated the average confirmation gained

from premises that belong to the same superordinate category as the conclusion, versus premises

that do not, in each taxonomy. We expected that the difference in confirmation between within-

and between-category premises would be larger for the derived taxonomy than an MFT-like

taxonomy.

Confirmation was substantially higher for within-category premises than between-

category premises in both the derived taxonomy (M_{Within} = 13.31, SD_{Within} = 13.65, $M_{Between}$ =

3.62, $SD_{Between}$ = 11.42, $t(366)$ = 16.45, $p < .001$, d_{RM} = .86)[10] and the MFT-like taxonomy

(M_{Within} = 11.60, SD_{Within} = 12.06, $M_{Between}$ = 5.33, $SD_{Between}$ = 11.48, $t(366)$ = 17.20, $p < .001$, d_{RM}

= .90). This suggests that both taxonomies capture the structure of people's taxonomies of moral

concepts to some degree. However, the difference in confirmation between within-category and

between-category premises was larger for the derived taxonomy than the MFT-like taxonomy,

suggesting that the former is a better model of representations of moral concepts (paired samples

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[10]d_{RM} denotes the repeated-measures Cohen's *d,* calculated as the mean within-subjects difference score, divided by
the standard deviation of difference scores (see Morris & DeShon, 2002).

t-test on the differences between within- and between-category premises: $t(366) = 5.58$, $p < .001$,

$d_{RM} = .29$).

We next examined cases where the two taxonomies make differing predictions about

which of two premises should be more informative about a given conclusion. These are the same

eight combinations of premises and conclusions examined in Study 2a. Paired-samples *t*-tests on

the confirmation measure generally agreed with the predictions of the derived taxonomy – in five

of eight cases, confirmation was significantly greater given the premise predicted by the derived

taxonomy, and in no cases was confirmation significantly greater given the premise predicted by

an MFT-like taxonomy (see Table 4). Averaging across the eight premise/conclusion

combinations, the results significantly supported the derived taxonomy.

Table 4. Within-subjects *t*-tests of confirmation from different premises.

| Conclusion | Within-Category Premises | | $t(366)$ | p | d_{RM} |
	MFT	**Derived**			
Authority	Purity	Care	5.18	< .001	0.27
Authority	Purity	Fairness	0.68	.495	0.04
Loyalty	Purity	Care	0.10	.923	0.01
Loyalty	Purity	Fairness	-0.61	.540	-0.03
Care	Liberty	Authority	4.10	< .001	0.21
Care	Liberty	Loyalty	2.15	.032	0.11
Fairness	Liberty	Authority	4.11	< .001	0.21
Fairness	Liberty	Loyalty	3.56	< .001	0.19
Overall			**5.09**	**< .001**	**0.27**

Next, we examined cases where the two taxonomies make differing predictions about

which conclusions should be more strongly supported by a given premise, analogous to Study

2b. Paired-samples *t*-tests of the confirmation measure were generally directionally consistent

with the predictions of the derived taxonomy and not an MFT-like taxonomy, though only

significantly so in two cases (see Table 5). Averaging across the eight premise/conclusion

combinations, the results significantly supported the derived taxonomy.

Table 5. Within-subjects *t*-tests of confirmation for different conclusions.

	Within-Category Conclusions				
Premise	**MFT**	**Derived**	**$t(366)$**	**p**	**d_{RM}**
Authority	Purity	Care	1.70	.091	0.09
Authority	Purity	Fairness	1.44	.152	0.08
Loyalty	Purity	Care	-0.07	.942	-0.00
Loyalty	Purity	Fairness	1.26	.208	0.07
Care	Liberty	Authority	5.06	< .001	0.26
Care	Liberty	Loyalty	1.47	.142	0.08
Fairness	Liberty	Authority	2.50	.012	0.13
Fairness	Liberty	Loyalty	1.75	.081	0.09
Overall			**3.68**	**< .001**	**0.19**

Finally, we constructed a vector contrasting the categorizations in the derived taxonomy

with those in an MFT-like taxonomy. Premise-conclusion pairs that belong to the same

superordinate category in the derived taxonomy but not in an MFT-like taxonomy (e.g.,

care/authority) were coded as 1, pairs that are in the same superordinate category in an MFT-like

taxonomy but not in the derived taxonomy (e.g., care/liberty) were coded as -1, and pairs that

both taxonomies categorize in the same way (e.g., care/fairness) were coded as 0. We computed

a Pearson correlation between this vector of categorizations and confirmation scores for each

participant. A positive correlation indicates that a participant's confirmation scores conform

more to the predictions of the derived taxonomy than to those of an MFT-like taxonomy, and a

negative correlation indicates the opposite.

Two hundred twenty-six participants out of 366 (62%)[11] expressed a positive correlation

(greater than 50%, binomial test $p < .001$). Also, the median correlation was significantly larger

than 0 (median $r = .044$, $W = 43,745$, $p < .001$, mean Fisher-transformed r-to-$z = .048$, one-

sample $t(366) = 5.37$, $p < .001$, $d = .28$). Participants' judgments conformed more to the

predictions of the derived taxonomy than an MFT-like taxonomy.[12]

Discussion

The confirmation that comes from learning about a prior behavior consistently resembled

the predictions of the derived taxonomy more than an MFT-like taxonomy. These results indicate

that liberty and purity violations were not rated as less likely in Study 1 and chosen less

frequently in Studies 2a and 2b *merely* because they are seen as statistically rarer. Even

accounting for differences in baseline frequency using a confirmation measure, participants'

inductive inferences still conformed more to the predictions of the derived taxonomy than an

MFT-like taxonomy.

Study 4

In Study 4, we tested cases where the derived taxonomy and an MFT-like taxonomy

make differing predictions about which categories are subsumed by a common superordinate

category. Participants made judgments about the likelihood of a behavior (conclusion) given two

prior behaviors (premises), for premise-premise-conclusion combinations where the two

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[11] One participant responded "50%" to every question, expressing no variance in his judgments. His data were
excluded from this analysis.

[12] In Studies 3 and 4, we also computed Anderson's *W,* a statistic that takes each taxonomy's predictions as separate
inputs into a mixture model that describes people's judgments. The *W* statistic characterizes the degree to which a
participant's responses resemble the predictions of one taxonomy versus the other (see Sanfey & Hastie, 2002). We
also separately correlated each participant's responses with the predictions of each taxonomy (same superordinate
category = 1, different superordinate category = 0), and examined the percentage of participants with more positive
correlations with the derived taxonomy than the MFT-like taxonomy. The results of these analyses were very
consistent with the primary analyses (see the Supplemental Material, where we also report all of these analyses for
Study 1).

taxonomies differ in their predictions. We predicted that participants' likelihood judgments would conform more to the predictions of the derived taxonomy.

Method

Participants. Four hundred-eighteen participants began the study on Amazon Mechanical Turk. After exclusions, we retained a final sample of $N = 372$ (191 female, $M_{Age} = 35.27$, $SD_{Age} = 11.15$). We aimed for a sample of approximately $N = 350$, for the same reason as in Study 3. This target sample size was determined before data collection.

Materials and Procedure. There are six combinations of two premises and a conclusion for which the two taxonomies make differing predictions about whether the conclusion belongs to the same superordinate category as the premises (see Table 6).

Table 6. Study 4 predictions.

Premises	Conclusion	Taxonomy Predicting Same Category
Care/Fairness	Liberty	MFT-like
Care/Fairness	Authority	Derived
Care/Fairness	Loyalty	Derived
Authority/Loyalty	Purity	MFT-like
Authority/Loyalty	Care	Derived
Authority/Loyalty	Fairness	Derived

Participants made 24 likelihood judgments of the same form as in Studies 1 and 3, but with two premises instead of one. For example, a participant might learn that a person drove past an injured man on an empty road (care) and edged out another person in a long line (fairness), and then indicate how likely it is that the person would send out an email calling their boss an "idiot" (authority). The premises and conclusions were randomly selected, with the restriction that each participant received four instances of each of the six combinations where the two taxonomies make differing predictions.

Results

As in Study 3, we created a vector of categorizations derived from the two taxonomies. Premise-premise-conclusion combinations that belong to the same superordinate category in the derived taxonomy, but not an MFT-like taxonomy, were coded as 1, whereas combinations that belong to the same superordinate category in an MFT-like taxonomy, but not the derived taxonomy, were coded as -1. We then computed within-subjects correlations between this vector and participants' likelihood judgments. A positive correlation indicates that a participant's judgments conform more to the predictions of the derived taxonomy than to the predictions of an MFT-like taxonomy, whereas a negative correlation indicates the opposite. Three hundred fifty-seven participants (96%) expressed a positive correlation (greater than 50%, binomial test $p <$ .001). Also, the median correlation was significantly greater than 0 (median $r = .45$, $W = 69,015$, $p < .001$, mean Fisher-transformed r-to-$z = .48$, one-sample $t(371) = 36.15$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.88$).

Discussion

In Study 4, we examined premise-premise-conclusion combinations where an MFT-like taxonomy and the derived taxonomy make different predictions. As in Study 3, participants' judgments conformed more to the predictions of the derived taxonomy than to those of an MFT-like taxonomy.

General Discussion

These studies used the methods of category-based induction research to examine how people represent moral concepts. Five studies suggested that our derived taxonomy reasonably approximates people's representation of the moral concepts under investigation here. Study 1 led us to develop this model based on the convergent results of multiple exploratory analyses.

Studies 2-4 used confirmatory methods and found that participants' judgments more closely

resembled the predictions of the derived taxonomy than the predictions of a taxonomy based on

Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). People seem to have a culturally-shared, hierarchical

representation of moral concepts that can produce systematic patterns of inductive inference.

This taxonomy is not organized into the types of social-functional categories emphasized in

MFT, but its structure is interpretable. People seem to view failure to observe rules of proper

social conduct (care, fairness, authority, loyalty, and politeness, i.e., propriety), misuse of the

body (purity), and oppression (liberty) – at least as they are instantiated in our stimulus set – as

distinct categories of violations.

Connection to Past Research

        Moral Foundations Theory. These findings are likely not problematic for MFT, as it is

typically articulated. As discussed above, MFT is not usually thought of as a theory of concepts

and categories. In MFT, individualizing and binding moral foundations are taken to represent

distinct strategies for regulating human behavior, suppressing selfishness, and allowing people to

live together cooperatively in groups (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). Different cultures and

subcultures embrace these approaches to different degrees (Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007;

Graham et al., 2009)—they elaborate different kinds of "moral systems" (Graham & Haidt,

2010), producing people who have internalized individualizing and binding virtues to greater and

lesser extents. Explicit endorsement of the individualizing and binding foundations as morally

important virtues supports this assertion; endorsement of care and fairness are highly correlated,

as are endorsement of loyalty, authority, and purity, whereas correlations between

individualizing and binding foundations (e.g., between care and loyalty) are much lower

(Graham et al., 2011; note that liberty had not yet been proposed as a moral foundation when this

research was conducted). In short, the individualizing and binding foundations are thought to represent two clusters of virtues that people embrace to varying degrees.

If care, fairness and liberty, and authority, loyalty, and purity form two distinct clusters of virtues that tend to co-occur in people's moral beliefs, then we might expect people to have some knowledge of this. In other words, we would expect people to hold beliefs like "people who care about fairness usually also care about preventing harm" and "people who do not care about loyalty usually also do not care about sexual purity". Consider once again the premise "Joe commits a fairness violation." This premise should indicate to people that Joe does not embrace the individualizing approach to morality, and therefore it should increase the subjective likelihood that Joe would also commit a care violation. It should provide less information, however, about whether Joe embraces the binding approach, and therefore should affect the subjective likelihood that Joe would also commit a loyalty violation to a lesser degree. So, although our results are not problematic for MFT as it is usually articulated, they are inconsistent with a prediction that could reasonably be derived from MFT.

However, what we value in others' behavior and what we expect others to do are different issues. A person might place greater value on rules relating to care and fairness than on rules relating to authority, loyalty, and politeness. But if this person observes another person violate a rule relating to authority, the observer might be unlikely to ignore this potentially valuable information. A key benefit of understanding a person's moral virtues (or lack thereof) is that it aids in predicting their future intentions and behaviors (Cottrell et al., 2007; Landy et al., 2016; Landy & Uhlmann, in press; Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011; Wojciszke et al., 1998). The observer might categorize the person who broke a rule related to authority as a "rule-breaker" and use this to predict that this person might be willing to break more valued rules of

propriety related to care and fairness. So, although people's explicitly endorsed moral values seem to cluster into individualizing and binding moral foundations, our results suggest that they might predict others' behaviors by assigning people to categories like "rule-breaker", "deviant", or "bully". This could have troubling implications if, for example, an observer sees someone who is unfamiliar with local customs violate an etiquette norm and infer, on this "thin slice" of behavior (Ambady, Bernieri, & Richeson, 2000; Carney, Colvin, & Hall, 2007), that this person might be the type who doesn't care about rules of propriety. This inference could easily affect the way the observer might treat this person, which could, of course, be problematic.

Social Domain Theory. Our findings may have implications for Social Domain Theory (SDT; Nucci & Nucci, 1982; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, Jambon & Ball, 2014; Turiel, 1983, 2002, 2014), another prominent theory of moral judgment. SDT states that an action can be wrong in two different senses; *moral* violations cause harm or injustice, and are always impermissible, whereas violations of *social convention* are impermissible only in particular cultures or contexts. The individualizing moral foundations roughly correspond to "moral" wrongs in SDT, with the binding foundations being more similar to "conventional" wrongs. Our results suggest that people might not make the moral/conventional distinction when predicting others' behavior. Some "moral" wrongs (care and fairness violations) are seen, by our participants, as informative about some "conventional" wrongs (authority and loyalty violations) and vice versa. Of course, people may still consider care and fairness violations to be more universally wrong than authority or loyalty violations, as SDT would predict (though see Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Haidt, Koller & Dias, 1993; Landy, 2016; Royzman, Landy, & Goodwin, 2014). Our methods and results cannot speak to this central claim of SDT.

Limitations

Frequency and weirdness. The stimuli used in this study were not equated for their

perceived baseline frequency. We collected norming data on this, but it proved impossible to

equate for both wrongness and frequency while retaining a sufficiently large number of stimuli to

broadly sample each moral foundation. We felt that equating for wrongness was more important,

and allowed our stimuli to vary in frequency across the moral foundations. This raises a

potential concern that liberty and purity violations may be considered less conceptually related to

other types of violations because they are less common, both as premises and as conclusions, in

the real world. These types of violations were, in fact, rated as less frequent in our norming

studies ($M_{Purity} = 3.97$; $M_{Liberty} = 4.84$; other category Ms > 5.62).

However, differences in frequency cannot fully explain our findings, for at least two

reasons. First, we did not find that people's taxonomies of moral concepts divide into "frequent

violations" and "infrequent violations". If they had, purity and liberty violations would be close

together in people's representations, but, in the MDS analyses in Study 1, they were at least as

distant from each other as from propriety violations (i.e., care, fairness, authority, loyalty, and

etiquette violations). Second, and more importantly, we accounted for differences in baseline

frequency using a confirmation measure in Study 3, and found that participants' inductive

judgments still more closely resembled the predictions of the derived taxonomy than an MFT-

like taxonomy.

Another potential issue is that if purity and liberty violations are perceived as more

"weird" than other types of violations, then this difference might partially explain why purity and

liberty do not cluster with the others. For two reasons, we do not think that differences in

weirdness fully explain the pattern of results we observe. First, we collected norming data on

perceived weirdness using a question adapted from Chakroff & Young (2015, Study 2), and

ratings of weirdness correlated strongly with ratings of baseline frequency ($r(252) = -.84$ across

all 244 stimuli we initially tested, $r(54) = -.86$ across our final stimulus set). Weirdness, as

measured here, seems to be largely synonymous with (in)frequency, which we accounted for in

Study 3. Second, we ran linear regressions predicting likelihood judgments in Study 1 from

frequency/weirdness ratings for each premise and conclusion that a participant saw, and the

distance between the premise and the conclusion in the derived taxonomy, with standard errors

clustered by participant (to account for repeated judgments within participant). Although the

frequency/weirdness of the premise and conclusion significantly affected likelihood judgments,

the effects of distance were also significant, indicating that the structure of the derived taxonomy

accounts for variance in judgments over and above baseline frequency or weirdness (see

Supplemental Materials for details).

That said, baseline frequency and weirdness surely do contribute to likelihood judgments

of moral violations (see, e.g., Gray & Keeney, 2015), and a full model of how these judgments

are made would incorporate information about the prior probabilities of different acts. Such a

model could include terms describing both the relatedness and/or causal connections between the

premises and conclusions as well as their prior probabilities (see, e.g., Blok, Osherson, & Medin,

2007; Rehder, 2017). Developing and testing a formal model of moral induction is a fruitful

direction for future research.

Stimulus selection. We used stimuli that were pre-tested to be uniquely good exemplars

of the six moral foundations, and we tried to broadly cover each moral foundation. However, we

cannot be sure that our stimuli constitute a representative sample of violations of each foundation

(if such a thing is even possible). Radically different stimuli could potentially produce different

results. Moreover, we may have omitted other virtues that feature prominently in people's

representations of moral concepts. We think that an especially strong candidate for such an

overlooked virtue is honesty, which has emerged as a central virtue in several distinct projects

aimed at understanding lay conceptions of moral character (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Lapsley &

Lasky, 2001; Walker & Hennig, 2004; Walker & Pitts, 1998). Although honesty is not

emphasized in MFT (though see Iyer, 2010), there is evidence that it holds an important place in

people's understanding of morality. For instance, knowledge of a person's honesty is rated as

highly useful for understanding their moral character (Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014), honesty

loads with other moral traits in exploratory factor analyses of ratings of real people's

personalities (Landy et al., 2016), and honesty is considered to be among the most fundamental

elements in one's identity (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). Therefore, our derived taxonomy

may not fully characterize people's theories of morality. Future research that does not take any

particular theory of morality as a starting point could inform this issue. Developing a fully

bottom-up model of moral concepts that does not inherit assumptions from any prior theory is a

difficult, but important, task for future research.

Future Directions

> **Other methods.** The current studies have used people's judgments about the likelihood

of behaviors to model their taxonomies of moral concepts, and this is just one of many

paradigms that could be used to examine the relatedness of concepts (see Balota & Coane, 2008).

Some other paradigms that have proven useful for this purpose, historically, have analyzed

reaction times (dating back to at least Collins & Quillian, 1969). Although our stimuli were

normed on several characteristics (and equated on mean levels of moral wrongness; see the five

norming studies in the Supplemental Materials), they differ on other characteristics (e.g., length,

word frequency, co-occurrence of words in common contexts, and reading level) that would

complicate analyses of reaction times (see Clifford et al., 2015, for stimuli that are more closely

equated on these sorts of low-level features). That said, we think that some predictions about

reaction times could be motivated by our framework. For example, if a participant has just

judged an authority violation, she might be faster to judge a subsequent fairness violation than a

subsequent purity violation, all else being equal, because if authority and fairness violations

belong to the same superordinate category, accessing one might increase the accessibility of the

other. Although we are aware of several complications in interpreting reaction times in

paradigms like these (see, e.g., Hutchinson, 2003; Lucas, 2000), we are cautiously optimistic that

testing predictions about reaction times derived from a framework like ours is a potentially

informative direction for future research.

Other people. Exploring how other cultures represent moral concepts is an important

avenue for future work (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). While the Cultural Consensus

Analysis in Study 1 suggests that our sample drew on shared conceptual knowledge of how

different kinds of violations relate, it is possible that these methods could yield different

taxonomies for other cultures. For example, in cultures where purity rules are more strongly

emphasized and more integrated into everyday behavior, purity might be more related to

propriety than it was in our samples. Moreover, exploring how different subcultures represent

moral concepts is also a potentially fruitful task. Even though the Cultural Consensus Analysis

indicates that our American participants agree on how different kinds of violations relate, to a

first approximation, there could still be meaningful subgroup differences (see, e.g., Medin,

Lynch, & Coley, 1997). We have no reason to assume any particular differences *a priori*, but it

is possible that there might be differences in how different groups represent these concepts.

As an initial test of this possibility, we regressed the within-subjects correlations from Studies 1, 3, and 4, and the average percentage of choices agreeing with the derived taxonomy in Studies 2a and 2b on the demographic information we collected (age, sex, race/ethnicity, political views, and education). These demographic characteristics generally proved to be relatively weak predictors of whether people represented moral concepts in a way that is more similar to the derived or MFT-like taxonomy (i.e., the small number of significant relationships that were detected [3 out of 40 tests] does not differ from what would be expected by chance alone, assuming Type I error of .05, binomial $p = .138$, and were inconsistent across studies). That said, further exploring such between-group differences, when they occur, could further illuminate how people represent moral actions and violations.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we derived a taxonomic model of how people mentally represent moral concepts that is organized by three superordinate categories of virtues: propriety, purity, and liberty. Although this taxonomic structure does not resemble the structure of Moral Foundations Theory, it is interpretable. This research provides new insight into how people parse their moral worlds, and demonstrates how methods from category-based induction research can be used to test the psychological plausibility of theories of moral judgment. More broadly, we think this research illustrates how classic methods from the psychology of concepts and categories can be used to answer questions in other areas of research, such as moral psychology and social psychology.

Context of the Research

The motivation for this research is based on Haidt and Joseph's (2004) initial formulation of Moral Foundations Theory, which presents it as a conceptual scheme for understanding the pan-culturally recognized virtues that form the basis of most moral codes. We realized that relatively little was known about how well this conceptual scheme matches the one that people carry around in their heads, and that this could be tested using classic methods from cognitive psychology. The first author's research is largely about judgments of moral violations and virtues, and the second author has long-standing research interests in both moral judgment and decision making and in concepts and categories, making this project a natural extension of both of our wider programs of research.

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